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 The growing problem of corruption in Iraq is intimately connect-
ed to the impotence of the current government and the enduring ethnic 
conflict the state experiences today.  This paper views this issue through 
a historical comparison informed by European history and relevant 
political theories.  Building on a theoretical framework composed of his-
tory, political science and cultural criticism, this paper will compare the 
experiences of present day Iraq to those of the former Yugoslavia.  I argue 
that the story of Yugoslavia is helpful to understand the internal conflicts 
of Iraq and further, that the comparative model I will employ brings into 
question the fundamental capabilities of the modern nation-state.
 At the very root of this conflict is the structure of the modern 
nation-state.  As historian Andrew Bergerson explains, the power of the 
nation-state is expressed as a monopoly on violence and taxation, the 
goal of which is to create and preserve centralized power. 1  The ideal, 
European nation-state, perhaps like France, would also reflect a homo-
geneous population in accordance with its single authority.  This ho-
mogeneity is imaginary, however, and the language and practices of the 
dominant culture, often embraced as “national” culture, become part and 
parcel of the governing itself.  Subordinate cultures are forced to abide 
by dominating mores, and their practices are frequently devalued and 
discriminated against.  Moreover, as Kristin Ross notes, “When modern-
ization has run its course, national subjectivity takes the place of class,” 
and, in effect, ethnicity comes to replace class as the basis of national cul-
ture. 2 The modern nation-state in some ways depends on this tension in 
order to function (disenfranchised groups are useful for cheap labor and 
a growing economy, for example), but when ethnic differences become 
the basis for political affiliation in a multi-ethnic state (particularly as a 
result of political upheaval), a process of decay begins which threatens 
the life of the superstructure.   
 Demography is one factor in this process. Ethnic unmixing--the 
geographical separation of ethnic groups--is a common response to gov-
ernmental disorder. Of his research on migration following the collapse 
1  Bergerson, Andrew. Public Lecture, University of Missouri-Kansas City.  12 
November 2007.
2  Ross, Kirstin.  Fast Cars, Clean Bodies.  Boston:  MIT Press, 1995. p. 149.
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of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Hungarian empires, historian Rogers 
Brubaker notes that “in the protracted course of post-imperial unmix-
ings, the phases of greatest intensity have for the most part been closely 
linked to actual or threatened violence, especially during or immediately 
after wars.”3 While the identity crisis associated with political collapse 
often reinforces ethnic identification and solidarity, the factors that influ-
ence ethnic migration after such political turmoil are complex.  Brubaker 
mentions “rootedness” of the new minority, “anticipated and actual poli-
cies of the successor states toward the minority,” “availability and quality 
of resettlement opportunities,” and “ ‘voice’ as an alternative to ‘exit’,” as 
factors in ethnic mobility. 4
 Similarly, political scientist Miles Kahler employs economist Al-
bert Hirschman’s concepts of voice, the extent to which citizens can par-
ticipate in their government, and exit, the propensity of a population to 
leave a group, in his work on decolonization as a means to explain public 
reaction to political failure. He writes, “Failure for the party leaders thus 
acquires two meanings: in the case of exit, the unsuccessful leaders have 
few followers or inactive ones; in the case of voice, the leaders face rebel-
lion or replacement.”5  While Kahler uses these terms in the context of 
loyalty to political parties, they are also useful to explore loyalty to the 
state itself. When the nation-state fails to provide mechanisms for voice 
over exit, the threat of succession or civil war arises.  Geographic mobil-
ity, which typically only fortifies pre-existing ethnic regions, ensues and 
amounts to political mobility, with each new boundary erected between 
ethnic groups acting also as a political boundary.  Such fragmentation 
paralyzes the state’s functioning as a whole.  These unmixings are com-
mon to distressed states and typically reflect ethnicity as an intensified 
form of political identity.  
 Brubaker cites Yugoslavia as a helpful example.  The five major 
ethnic groups represented in Yugoslavia--Serbians, Croats, Montene-
grins, Macedonians and Slovenes--had independent national histo-
ries and approximate territories. Josip Broz Tito, the Socialist Party’s 
general-secretary in Yugoslavia in 1937 and president from 1953 to 
1980, acknowledged Yugoslavia’s different ethnic groups and their ter-
ritories but also attempted to form a collective “socialist Yugoslavian 
consciousness.”6  This tension reached a head during the global protests 
of the summer of, as Yugoslavia’s minority populations protested their 
3  Brubaker, Rogers.  “Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples.” After 
Empire: Multi-Ethnic Societies and Nation-Building.  Eds. Karen Barkey and  Mark Von 
Hagen.  Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1997.  167-68.
4  Ibid. 167.
5  Kahler, Miles. Decolonization in Britain and France. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press., 1984. 85.
6  Pavković, Aleksander.  The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia:  Nationalism and War 
in the Balkans.  New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 2000.  62.
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oppression under the dominant cultures of the different nations within 
the state along side the protests that occurred between the five domi-
nant ethnic groups.  In fact, Muslim protest even spurred a new wave of 
underground Serbian nationalism. While nationalist movements like that 
of the Serbs remained secretive because of the heavy hand of the social-
ist government, which eradicated threats to peaceful socialism, political 
resolutions in the coming years made almost certain the demise of the 
forced harmony of nations under Tito’s rule.  
 A new Yugoslav constitution drafted in 1974 gave the ethnic 
groups more autonomy in the form of a semi-confederation.  It also set 
up a governing body which, following the death of President-for-life Tito, 
rotated the presidency between the nations each year.  This new model 
forced aspiring politicians to identify with their ethnic group as a path 
to political power, lending further strength to nationalist movements 
which, after the death of Tito in 1980, became less secretive.  The result 
was the near eradication of non-ethnic political voice.  In 1988, Slobodan 
Milosevic began to openly organize and promote Serbian nationalism, 
and in 1990 Dr. Franjo Tudjman, a genocide apologist, was elected presi-
dent of Croatia.  The disintegration of the USSR in 1989 dealt a moral 
blow to socialists worldwide, and at the same time in Yugoslavia power 
moved from the hands of the centralized socialist union to the diverse 
hands of the local population whose cultivated differences undermined 
their ability to cooperate.   Croatians and Slovenes fought to withdraw as 
autonomous states while Serbians and Montenegrins pushed to retain 
the Yugoslav state.  When Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to secede as 
well, the predominantly Serbian Yugoslav army advanced in an effort to 
reverse the proceedings.  
 The official combat between the territories in the early 1990s is 
less important for this argument than the ethnic violence that took place 
within each.  In these divided territories, dominant ethnic groups battled 
to maintain majority rule as their subordinate counterparts fought to 
save their ethnic identity.  The Serbians in what remained of Yugoslavia 
helped to finance, arm and feed Bosnian Serbs who fought in Bosnia 
against secessionist non-Serbs in an effort not only to gain political con-
trol of the territory but also to render it more Serbian ethnically.  When 
the centralized, bureaucratic powers of the socialist government fell with 
the death of its leader and the collapse of other states in the region, the 
restructuring and consequent bids for political power by the remaining 
Yugoslavs, with a Serbian majority, were organized and fueled by ethnic 
identity.  The result is a project on the part of each group to both “reaf-
firm the sovereignty of ‘its’ nation over the territory that was claimed for 
it” and creating within that territory an ethnically homogeneous nation. 7  
7  Pavković, Aleksander.  The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia:  Nationalism and 
War in the Balkans.  New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 2000.  97.
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The ‘national’ identity of Yugoslavia was only espoused by the Serbs, who 
understood it as an extension of Serbian identity and who stood to gain 
more political control with its preservation.  The cycle of cultural violence 
and ethnic unmixing continued, ensuring the demise of Yugoslavia, and 
today each nation is a separate state. 
 The causes, characteristics and consequences of the breakup 
of Yugoslavia can in many respects be used a model for understanding 
ethnic conflicts in the modern nation-state.  The fragmentation reflects 
the state’s inability to maintain a monopoly on violence and taxation 
in a centralized government during the tumult of political transition 
caused by the disintegration of centralized power and organized by ethnic 
nationalism.  While the previous oppressive and centralized ruling body 
suppressed ethnic nationalism, it also reinforced ethnic identity.  This 
identification quickly becomes the vehicle for political participation in 
the transitional period after the change of authority.  The multi-ethnic 
state, once it begins to make formal political organization based on ethnic 
identity, can hardly reverse the influence of such affiliations and their 
subsequent bids for cultural dominance. The ensuing ethnic unmixing 
and violence are inherent in the collapse of a modern multi-ethnic state 
and, I contend, are ultimately insurmountable to the project of modern 
multi-ethnic nation-building.
 Consider the case of present day Iraq.  The ethnic combat oc-
curring today is the result of social structures and policies similar to this 
model.  When the Ba’ath Party successfully seized power in 1968, its 
platform promoted secular modernization, military strength and Pan-
Arabism.8  During the next decade and a half, Iraqi foreign and domestic 
policy quadrupled oil revenues and used the money to build a strong mil-
itary and also crucial infrastructure like roads and schools.  Pan-Arabist 
sentiment was the outcome of Arab resentment of British colonization 
and the political power of the West and advocated the political alliance 
of Arab peoples.  This unification, of course, did not include the ethnic 
Kurds living in Iraq, a mostly Muslim group whose heritage was different 
than Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites.  When Saddam Hussein, in a Stalin-like 
move, usurped his mentor, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, in 1979, ethnic dif-
ferences, though not officially legislated, came to be a driving factor in 
domestic politics.
 Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, shortly after taking power 
purged the Ba’ath Party of dissidents and replaced them with loyal Sun-
nis.  Though Sunnis constitute a majority of Muslims worldwide, they 
are the minority in Iraq.  The CIA World Factbook estimates that Sunnis 
make up only 32%-37% of the population.9  Though the Iraqi government 
8  PRI: The World.  “The History of Iraq: Part II The Rise of Saddam Hussein.” Ed.  
Jeb Sharp.  12 February 2003. <<http://www.theworld.org/?q=node/5554>>.
9  CIA World Factbook.  Accessed 7 December 2007.  <<https://www.cia.gov/
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was not explicitly ethnically based, Hussein filled its offices with those 
of his own affiliation, a move that can be traced back to his adolescence.  
Hussein came of age living with his politically active uncle in Tikrit, a 
town whose social structure was influential to the future president.  His-
torian Phebe Marr explains, “Tikrit in those days was tribally organized.  
Tribal values, tribal clan life was really at the core of how, not only how 
you organized yourself but how you identified.” 10  Having grown up feel-
ing strong ties to local community and ethnicity, Hussein brought these 
inclinations with him to Baghdad. 
 What resulted from his presidency was increased tension be-
tween politically dominant Sunnis and disenfranchised Shiites.  In ad-
dition, in the name of Pan-Arabism, the Kurdish peoples of Iraq became 
a target of violence.  During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Hussein 
implemented anti-Kurdish policies and began directly attacking their 
region between 1988 and 1991 in a campaign called Anfal.  Hussein 
ordered massive air attacks, using chemical weapons, and decimated ap-
proximately 4,500 villages, killing as many as 100,000 Kurds.11  During 
this time, thousands of Kurds were deported to the southern reaches of 
Iraq in an attempt to dilute their 1991 uprising.  At this point, the United 
Nations stepped in to create a Safe Zone under which the Kurds lived 
in relatively peaceful, functioning democracy until Hussein’s ouster in 
2003. Since 2003, however, the ethnic cleansing and discrimination ram-
pant in Hussein’s Iraq have not been forgotten by either Iraqis or their 
American occupiers.  
 When American forces deposed Hussein and subsequently 
aimed to build a new government, they purged all government offices of 
Ba’athists, loyal ideologues and passive technocrats alike.12  Americans 
relegated the responsibility of drafting a new constitution and build-
ing a new government largely to the Shiite Muslims, only reinforcing 
the ethnic hostility nurtured in Hussein’s Iraq.  Meanwhile, a class of 
newly unemployed and disenfranchised Sunni Muslims turned militant 
against the American occupation and against their Shiite and Kurdish 
supporters.  In turn, a wave of Shiite militant groups formed to address 
the Sunni violence.  This violence begat classic ethnic unmixing, as towns 
and whole regions began to be identifiable as Sunni, Shiite or Kurdish 
strongholds.  Conditions such as these severely complicate the process of 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>>.
10  Marr, Phebe. PRI: The World. “History of Iraq: Part II The Rise of Saddam Hus-
sein.” Ed.  Jeb Sharp.  12 February 2003. <<http://www.theworld.org/?q=node/5554>>.
11  Bull, Bartle Breese.  “Will the Kurds go Home?” The New York Times.  9 June 
2004.   Accessed 8 December 2007.  <<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9
902E1DD1630F93AA35755C0A9629C8B63>>.
12  Wong, Edward.  “Mayhem in Iraq is Starting to Look like Civil War.”  The New 
York Times.  5 December 2004.  Accessed 7 December 2007.  <<http://www.nytimes.
com/2004/12/05/weekinreview/05wong.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&oref=slogin>>.
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building a new and unified Iraqi republic.
 The latest blow to this process has been recent reports of mass 
corruption in the Iraqi government.  As Damien Cave reports in a recent 
New York Times article, among Iraqi and American officials, “there is 
a growing sense that, even as security has improved, Iraq has slipped 
into new depths of lawlessness.” 13 Stolen government property can now 
be found on the black market selling at inflated prices, as well as drugs 
and medications.  With estimates of unemployment reaching 40%, $500 
bribes become the only way to secure a government job.  Corruption in 
Iraq ranges from top to bottom, from a profit-directed enterprise to a 
method of survival.  What the unceasing pilfering more clearly demon-
strates, however, is the lack of confidence in the Shiite-led democratic 
nation-state. One Shiite tribal leader quoted in the article offered an 
analogy:  “It’s a very large meal,” he claimed, “and everyone wants to 
eat.”  Whether such consumption is the product of famine or gluttony, 
the corruption it entails constitutes one more hurtle to the legitmacy of 
the struggling government.
 In addition, the undermining of traditional economy only nour-
ishes Iraqi ethnic conflict.  Cave notes, “Some American officials esti-
mate that as much as a third of what they spend on Iraqi contracts and 
grants end up unaccounted for or stolen, with a portion going to Shiite or 
Sunni militias.”  In this sense, American aid sponsors both the struggling 
legitimacy of the current Iraqi government and the violent campaigns of 
sectarian violence that seek to undermine it.  This process of corruption 
both begins and ends with disbelief in the current government’s ability to 
govern. 
 In sum, the situation in Iraq reflects the model of ethnic conflict 
and the collapse of the modern nation-state elucidated above.  While 
Hussein’s government, centralized and oppressive, was able to keep a 
monopoly on violence that ensured their power over a unified whole, the 
leader’s removal and the dispersal of power brought to the fore the latent 
ethnic conflict fostered in the previous regime.  The pattern of suppress-
ing ethnic nationalism while reinforcing ethnic identity as a necessary 
form of political participation was continued by the American plan to 
turn the bulk of power over to the Shiite majority.  Further, the subse-
quent cycle of ethnic violence and unmixing is evidenced in the acknowl-
edged areas of dominance of Sunni or Shiite militias.  Hussein’s effort to 
disperse the Kurds throughout Iraq correctly anticipated that their mix-
ing with Sunni and Shiite populations would weaken their ability to fight 
back and stall any attempt at secession.  That process is being reversed 
today, another reflection of the new central government’s inability to 
monopolize the violence that produces ethnic unmixing.  The corruption 
13  Cave, Damien.  “Nonstop Theft and Bribery Stagger Iraq.” The New York Times.  
2 December 2007. A1, A14.
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in Iraq is simply another indicator of the nation-state’s decay into ethnic 
identity, conflict and unmixing in which the category “Iraqi” holds less 
and less meaning. Given these similarities to the fragmentation of the 
former Yugoslavia, it is reasonable to expect a similar outcome.
It is further interesting to note that ethnic tension and territory dis-
putes still plague the former Yugoslav states today.  The February 2008 
declaration of independence by Kosovo (a predominantly ethnic Alba-
nian region of Serbia which has been under UN control since 1999) has 
resulted in protests and rioting by Serbian nationalists, a call for new 
Serbian elections and has jeopardized Serbia’s entry into the European 
Union.14 Once acknowledged, ethnic identity and unmixing do not simply 
fade with time.  Similarly, in Iraq, although recent estimates chart sectar-
ian violence at a new low, a recent article by CNN reporter Joe Sterling 
suggests that one reason for this decline may be “because of the demo-
graphic shifts that have made mixed neighborhoods either all Shiite or 
all Sunni.”15  With unmixing complete in some areas of Iraq, the recent 
calming of ethnic violence may only be a sleeping lion.
 What can be gleaned from this comparison is either the absolute 
incompatibility of different ethnic groups in one state or the fundamen-
tal dysfunction of the modern nation-state. I argue the latter, that the 
fits and starts of Iraq are best interpreted as the death-rattle of political 
modernity. The last fifty years has seen the collapse of empires, like the 
Soviet Union, the death of multi-ethnic nation-states, like Yugoslavia, 
and the consolidation of sovereign states under the umbrella of supra-
national governing bodies, like the European Union.  The ideal modern 
nation-state does not exist and cannot exist given the inequities it wreaks 
against a diverse human population.  The racial and ethnic conflicts 
defined by social modernity find expression in the political modernity of 
the nation-state. As monopolies on violence and taxation are undermined 
by the globalized world in which we live, the anachronistic methods of 
governing multi-ethnic nation-states in line with these modern impera-
tives are increasingly ineffective and ill-directed. Iraq is a prime example 
of the inadequacies of political modernity and the necessity of a new, 
post-modern political structure.
14  “Serb PM dissolves government.” CNN.com. 8 Mar 2008. Accessed 14 
Mar 2008. <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/03/08/serbia.ap/index.
html?iref=newssearch>
15  Sterling, Joe. “Some progress in Iraq’s powder keg a year after surge.” CNN.com. 
22Feb 2008.  Accessed 14 Mar 2008. <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/22/
iraq.surge/index.html#cnnSTCText>.
